Kamijo, Y., & Nakama, D. (仲間大輔) (2023). Designing division of labor with strategic uncertainty within organizations: Model analysis and a behavioral experiment. 社会的不確実性がある組織内の分業の設計： ゲーム理論モデル分析と行動実験 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 32(2), 257-272. https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12506
For managers who are responsible for designing the division of labor, there are prototypes such as the divisional and functional designs, but insufficient knowledge of what to consider when selecting them. To address this shortfall, we developed a multiple economic game model with a two-step structure to examine the strategic interdependence between the two prototypes. We analyzed the model from three different perspectives: a traditional analysis, an equilibrium analysis, and a behavioral analysis followed by a laboratory experiment. While the first analysis revealed that the functional design would outperform divisional design when individual decisions are exogenous, the game theoretic equilibrium analysis demonstrated that the two prototype designs have similar equilibria when individuals are rational. However, assuming that individuals made autonomous decisions with accessible information under given organizational structures, behavioral analysis derived predictions that the divisional design was more likely to produce favorable consequences than the functional design. This prediction was confirmed by the economic experiment in the laboratory. These results imply that the strategic uncertainty within organizations differs according to the designs and affects organizational consequences.