Maeda, K. (前田楓), & Hashimoto, H. (橋本博文) (2020). Time pressure and in-group favoritism in a minimal group paradigm. タイムプレッシャーが最小条件集団パラダイムにおける集団内協力行動に及ぼす効果 Frontiers in Psychology, 11:603117. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.603117
Based on the group heuristic model and the model of intuitive cooperation, we hypothesized that in-group favoritism would be conspicuously shown through an intuitive process. To test this hypothesis, we utilized a minimal group paradigm, which is traditionally used in social psychological studies, and manipulated decision time in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game to compare the cooperative contribution level toward in-group and out-group members under three conditions: intuitive, empathic deliberation, and rational deliberation. Our findings confirmed that in-group favoritism was clearly shown in the intuitive condition only, suggesting that the intuitive cooperation model may only be valid in the context of social exchange with in-group members. Additional analysis also showed that in-group favoritism disappeared for participants who had been forced into empathic or rational deliberation for decision making. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.